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The Bologna process inspired the Italian 3+2 reform of the university system which 
constitutes a big increase in the supply of college graduates. This paper is a preliminary 
attempt to identify the effects of the reform on (i) the relative probability (relative to non-
graduates) of employment of college graduates in the age range 25-34; (ii) their quality of 
employment measured with the relative probability of being employed with a temporary 
contract; (iii) the college wage premium. Using administrative data to identify the gradual 
introduction of the reform in different universities, we find that the reform increases 
significantly the relative employment of graduates except for women in the South where the 
rapid increase of female post-reform graduates has not been absorbed by the weak labour 
market. Finally we find that post-reform college graduates have a significantly lower college 
premium with respect to high school graduates than pre-reform graduates. 
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Italy was among the ￿rst countries to change its university system according to
European guidelines designed to make recognition of degrees easier across countries
(the so called Bologna process). A system in which students could enroll into either
four- or ￿ve-years degrees was abandoned in favor of a unitary two-tier system
made of 3 years of general courses + 2 years of specialisation degrees (henceforth
called 3+2 reform). One of the goals of the 3+2 reform was to ensure a larger
di⁄usion of university education among the population and in fact the 3+2 reform
not only substitutes old graduates with new 3+2 graduates but also constitutes a
big increase in the supply of college graduates. This paper is a preliminary attempt
to identify the e⁄ects of the reform on (i) the relative probability of employment of
college graduates in the age range 25￿ 34; (ii) their quality of employment measured
with the relative probability of being employed with a temporary contract; (iii) the
college wage premium. All outcome measures are relative to non-graduates and
refer to the labor market of all graduates (pre-reform and post-reform graduates
alike).
We are not the ￿rst to analyze the e⁄ects of the Italian 3+2 reform. Recent
research has shown that the reform increased college education (Cappellari and
Lucifora, 2009) and reduced drop-out (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006). Cappellari
and Lucifora also show that the reform had a di⁄erential e⁄ect on individuals
by family background and mostly bene￿tted able individuals coming from lower
backgrounds. These papers look at college enrollment as dependent variable. In
another study Bratti et al. (2011) consider college completion (rather than en-
rollment) probabilities and wage outcomes of university graduates. They focus on
social gradients in educational and employment outcomes and ￿nd that the mag-
nitude of the advantage given by parental socio-economic status is not reduced by
the reform. More papers looked at other countries: Machin and Blanden (2004)
analyzed the expansion of higher education in the UK and Cardoso et al. (2008)
analyzed the choice of prospective students among colleges which implemented the
reform in Portugal and those which did not. We join this debate studying the e⁄ect
of the Italian reform on wage and employment outcomes of graduates relative to
2non graduates. We use variation in the introduction of the reform by universities
to identify changes in the supply of college graduates. In this respect the paper is
close to Bratti et al. (2008) who use the opening of new colleges during the 1990s
in Italy to identify the change in supply and look at the e⁄ect on the probability
of college enrollment (see also Currie and Moretti, 2003).
The reform was introduced in year 1999 and reached its implementation stage
in the academic year 2001 through the establishment of new 3+2 degrees. Thanks
to their autonomy, each university introduced the new degrees with di⁄erent tim-
ing and the ￿rst 3+2 graduates appeared in 2002. Aggregating universities by
region, we use time and region variation in the share of 3+2 graduates to mea-
sure the variable introduction of the reform by region and to measure its e⁄ect on
the graduate labor market. To instrument the share of 3+2 graduates we exploit
supply variation in the enforcement of the reform (i.e. the number of 3+2 degrees
introduced in each region and the number of students enrolled in 3+2 degrees three
years earlier) with the assumption -which we test- that universities which intro-
duced the 3+2 degrees more rapidly did so independently from demand conditions
and the employment probabilities of their students. Since we identify the share of
3+2 graduates with variation in supply and we show that regions with a higher
share of 3+2 graduates also have a larger total production of all (old and new)
graduates in proportion to the population, we refer to the share of 3+2 graduates
as a supply shift.
The reform does two things, substitutes gradually old with new 3+2 graduates
and increases the total supply of graduates in the market. There are two poten-
tially opposite e⁄ects of the reform on the employment probabilities of graduates
(all graduates) wrt. non-graduates. On the one hand the coe¢ cient on university
reform may pick up a composition e⁄ect: the new 3+2 graduates have di⁄erent
unobservable characteristics, for one they are younger and ￿nd jobs more quickly
wrt. to old graduates. This e⁄ect would predict a positive e⁄ect of the reform on
the relative employment rate of graduates wrt. non-graduates. On the other hand
the 3+2 reform has also increased the total supply of graduates in the market and
therefore may have made their employment harder unless there is an o⁄setting in-
3crease in demand for graduates and/or a decline in their relative wages. Therefore
if we ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of the reform on employment probabilities, this is due
to an excess supply of graduates. If instead we ￿nd a positive e⁄ect, we expect
to observe that the increase in supply has been accompanied with a decrease in
wages. To distinguish the composition e⁄ect we should observe that the positive
e⁄ect on new graduates is accompanied by an opposite e⁄ect on old graduates.
We ￿nd that the 3+2 reform increases signi￿cantly the relative employment of
male graduates. The reform a⁄ects weakly also the employment of female grad-
uates, however, for women there are signi￿cant di⁄erences across regions. In the
South the e⁄ect is reversed and the 3+2 reform reduces the employment proba-
bilities of female graduates relative to non-graduates which may be interpreted as
an indication that the rapid increase of female graduates has not been absorbed
in the labor market.
There are several reasons why an increase in the supply of graduates may have
increased the employment probability of graduates relative to non-graduates (at
least it did so for males). Contemporaneously to the university reform, the intro-
duction of more ￿ exible contracts may have increased the demand for graduates
and absorbed the excess supply. Therefore in the regressions we control for de-
mand shifts caused by two reforms of ￿ exible contracts (see the Appendix on the
"Biagi" law). Secondly the coe¢ cient on university reform may pick up a compo-
sition e⁄ect favorable to new 3+2 graduates. To this extent we compare old and
new graduates to see if the positive e⁄ects of the reform are limited to the new
graduates or spill over to all graduates. Finally we look at the e⁄ect of the reform
on the probability of employment in a temporary contract and on relative wages:
if the increase in the supply of graduates outstrips demand, we should observe
downward pressure on the college premium and/or more graduates employed on
￿ exible contracts (most of the times with lower wages and shorter tenure).
The results on the probability of being employed in a temporary contracts
show that the university reform a⁄ects the quality of employment only for males.
This result is consistent with a supply-demand framework where a large supply
shift for men has been absorbed by higher ￿ exibility of contracts - which lowered
4relative wages and thus avoided the increase of the unemployment rate - while this
is not true for women in the South. Finally using National Statistics (ISTAT) data
and also consistently with a picture of rising supply in the face of stable demand,
we ￿nd that college graduates after the reform have a signi￿cantly lower college
premium with respect to high school graduates three years after graduation, both
men and women.
This paper is structured in the following way: in Section 2 we document the
LFS data and present the empirical strategy. In Section 3 we document the data
provided by CNVSU on the 3+2 reform and explain the identi￿cation of the supply
shifts. In Section 4 we present and discuss the results on employment probabilities
and in Section 5 we describe the results on the probability of being employed on
a temporary contract. In Section 6 we look at the college wage premium of post-
reform graduates of 2004 vs. that of pre-reform graduates of 2001 using ISTAT
data. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Data sources and model speci￿cation
The two outcome variables of interest are the employment rate of college graduates
vs. that of non-graduates and their relative probability of being employed with a
temporary contract. The empirical analysis is carried out using individual data of
the Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 1998￿ 2007. The LFS refers
to the April record of each year until 2003 and then to all quarters from 2004.1
We select the sample of all individuals between 25 and 34 years of age in the years
between 1998 and 2007 who are not currently full-time students.
Appendix Table 1 of the descriptive statistics shows that the distribution across
regions is similar for graduates and non-graduates while the distribution across
1From the ￿rst quarter of 2004, the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) has introduced
several changes in the LFS structure moving from a survey taken in a speci￿c week in each quarter
to a continuous survey during all weeks of the year (see De Angelini, 2006). Given the relevant
discontinuity, comparisons between the old and new labour force survey are not easy; fortunately
our analysis focusses on the relative employment rate (and the relative probability of being on a
temporary contract) of college graduates therefore the changes should not be important as long
as they a⁄ect in the same way graduates and non-graduates.
5sectors is more skewed towards services for graduates and to manufacturing jobs for
non-graduates. The share of females is higher among graduates which constitutes
slightly more than one sixth of the total sample (55,000 graduates and 320,000 non-
graduates). The Table also shows the rapid increase in the number of graduates
after the reform.
Figure 1 indicates that the probability of being employed is substantially higher
for non-graduates than for graduates in the age range 25￿ 34. This is not surprising
because in this age range non-graduates have a much longer work experience than
graduates. Unfortunately the LFS provides the information on age only in brackets
and does not report the year of graduation making impossible to control for actual
labor market experience.2 We put dummies for each age bracket in all regressions.
The same Figure 1 shows that graduates have a signi￿cantly higher probability of
being employed with a temporary contract than non-graduates. The vertical line
indicates the introduction of the univeristy reform, we investigate if the relative
probabilities changed with the gradual introduction of the 3+2 reform after 2002.
2.1 Model speci￿cation
To assess the impact of the reform on the relative employment rate of college
graduates we could simply run the following regression on individual LFS data:
eit = ￿ + ￿1graduateit + ￿2post + ￿3gradit ￿ post where eit = 1 if individual i is
employed in year t and post = 1 if year >=2002. The variable graduateit = 1
if individual i holds a college degree and zero otherwise indicates the treatment
group. However the introduction of the 2002 reform took place gradually in each
university. As shown in the next section, using administrative data we build a
"treatment intensity" variable: the share of 3+2 graduates as percentage of the
total number of graduates in each university in each year. This variable share(3+
2The best we can do - in the robustness section of the results- is to compare graduates aged
25-34 to non-graduates aged 16-24 and to introduce a proximate experience variable which takes
value 3 and 9 for graduates in the age range 25-29 and 30-34 respectively (assuming they graduate
on average at 24 before the reform and at 22 after the reform-therefore experience is 5 and 11
years for 3+2 graduates after the reform) and 9 and 15 for non-graduates in the same age range
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Figure 1: The employment rate and share of temporary contracts of graduates and
non-graduates aged 25-34
72)jt aggregated at the regional level is zero before year 2002 and measures the
intensity of the reform after 2002. We match this variable to LFS data and use it
instead of the simple pre-post treatment dummy.
The ￿nal speci￿cation on the LFS sample of all individuals between 25 and 34
years of age in the years between 1998 and 2007 is a linear probability model3:
eijt = ￿+X￿+￿1graduateit+￿2share(3+2)jt+￿3graduateit￿share(3+2)jt+D+￿j+￿t+"ijt
(1)
where the dependent variable eijt is a dummy variable=1 if individual i is
employed in year t and zero otherwise, or a dummy=1 if the individual is employed
as a temporary worker (any type of temporary contract: apprendistato, stage,
co.co.co, ￿xed term, etc.) and zero if he/she is employed in an open-ended contract.
All estimates include a vector containing regional dummies ￿j that control for mean
di⁄erences across regions and year dummies ￿t that control for time shifts common
to all regions. The vector X contains only a dummy for age bracket 25-29 and
30-34 and nine sector dummies. The vector D contains two labor market reform
dummies ref_apprit and ref_fixedtit and their interactions with the dummy
graduateit. We introduce this term because, contemporaneous to the introduction
of the 3+2 reform, labour market reforms may have increased the relative demand
for graduates and a⁄ected their relative employment probability. We model the
e⁄ect of these demand shocks to avoid a potentially serious omitted variable bias.
The two reforms of the apprenticeship contract and of the ￿xed term contract are
captured by the dummies ref_apprit and ref_fixedtit which vary respectively
at the regional-sectoral and at the sectoral level. The details of their construction
are in the Appendix. Finally "ijt is a zero-mean stochastic error term, standard
errors are clustered by region and year in order to avoid that serial correlation in the
3We choose to estimate linear probability models because all covariates in equation 1, with
the exception of share(3 + 2), are dummy variables, so the model is almost fully saturated. In
the extreme case of a fully saturated model, i.e. one where all independent variables are discrete
variables for mutually exhaustive categories, the linear probability model is completely general
and the ￿tted probabilities lie within the interval [0, 1]. Furthermore linear probability OLS
models deliver unbiased and consistent estimates when variables uncorrelated with the included
covariates are omitted from the regression, non-linear models such as probit or logit models do
not have this property.
8variables may lead to biased standard errors. We run separate regressions for males
and females because in some regions of Italy they have very di⁄erent employment
rates and in the robustness checks section we run common regressions.
The coe¢ cient of interest is ￿3 which picks up the e⁄ect of the university re-
form of graduates and tells us how the probability of employment for any graduate
changes in regions where all graduates are of the old type to regions where all grad-
uates are of the new type. The ￿rst set of results is generated by OLS estimation.
To interpret this exercise as uncovering the causal e⁄ect of the university reform
we need the share of 3+2 college graduates to be uncorrelated with the resid-
ual determinants in ". Essentially, we identify the e⁄ects of interest estimating a
di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences model, with the source of identi￿cation being provided by
the exogenous variation in the introduction of 3+2 reform. We assume that di⁄er-
ences between graduates and non graduates in terms of labour market outcomes
are exclusively driven by the reforms, i.e. treated and control groups experience
common trends. Secondly, note that in this speci￿cation we make no distinction
between old and new graduates, we look at the e⁄ect of the reform on the relative
employment probability of all graduates before and after the introduction of the
reform i.e. we assume they face the same labor market conditions and rule out
composition e⁄ects.4 Finally we assume the region as local labor market therefore
graduates of one region increase supply in the same region (see next section). In
the case of Italy this assumption seems quite reasonable. The inter-regional mo-
bility of university students is low, Bratti et al. (2008) report that 84% of the
graduates aged 23-31 were resident in the region in which they studied, 79% stud-
ied in the region in which they were born and regions of study, residence and birth
coincide for 78% of the sample. These ￿gures are slightly lower for Southern Italy
4Admittedly this is a strong assumption because new 3+2 graduates may have di⁄erent char-
acteristics, but obviously the e⁄ect of the reform cannot be evaluated on them because they
have no pre-treatment status. Later on we relax this assumption and look at how the variable
introduction of the reform a⁄ects separately new and old graduates after 2004 (the year when
the new graduates start to appear in LFS data). Assessing whether the supply of new gradu-
ates a⁄ects di⁄erentially new and old graduates requires addressing the issue of substitution and
complementarity of old and new graduates. This problem is best addressed with ￿rm-level data
rather than with individual level data. DePaoli (2011) looks at substitution between new and
old types in ￿rm demand for graduates.
9(76%, 80% and 75%, respectively).5
The second set of estimates is obtained from IV estimation. We instrument the
share of 3+2 graduates in year t with the share of 3+2 degrees and the number
of enrolled students in the 3+2 degrees three years before in year t ￿ 3. The
assumption is that, while the share of 3+2 graduates by region may be endogenous
to the employment rate of graduates in the same region, the share of post-reform
3+2 degrees opened in the same region three years before is likely to be more
independent unless universities were targeting the graduates￿employment rate
when deciding on the timing of the introduction of the new degrees. For this
interpretation to be legitimate, we need the share of 3+2 degrees in t ￿ 3 to
a⁄ect the probability of employment only through the share of 3+2 graduates. If
the supply of 3+2 degrees simply mimics the rise in the number of individuals
completing upper secondary school, i.e. if universities set up new 3+2 degrees in
regions where the demand for education is currently rising (or expected to rise),
then the instruments would not be valid and the estimated e⁄ect on share(3 +
2)jt could hardly be considered to be supply driven. We test the validity of the
instrument in the next section. According to this identi￿cation strategy share(3+
2)jt is identi￿ed by supply changes due to universities￿choices, in the next section
we also show that share(3+2)jt is a good indicator of the total ￿ ow of graduates
produced in region j in year t and therefore we refer to it as a supply shifter in
the number of graduates in the market.
5It may be the case that some graduates moved out of the region after graduation and the
coe¢ cient of the reform could be potentially underestimated if those who left are those who could
not ￿nd a job. Alternatively some individuals may have moved to regions in which the expansion
of 3+2 supply was greater because they wanted to enrol in college or because these regions had
more employment opportunities (see Currie and Moretti 2003). In this case, we would be likely
to overestimate the e⁄ect of university reform because of positive self-selection. Unfortunately
we do not have information on individuals for whom the current region of residence coincides
with the region of birth or the region where they went to school.
103 The university reform in Italy: a shift in the
supply of graduates
Although the reform was implemented in the academic year 2001/2002 across Italy,
the introduction of the reform took place gradually in each university through the
establishment of new 3+2 degrees. We use the administrative data provided by
the Centro Nazionale Valutazione Studi Universitari (hereafter CNVSU) for the
academic years 1998/99￿ 2007/08. The dataset provides information at the level
of each single university on: (i) the number of male and female graduates in the
"old" Laurea degree as well as in the ￿rst and second level 3+2 degrees created
by the reform; (ii) the number of 3+2 degrees introduced at faculty level in each
academic year; (iii) the number of male and female students enrolled in the "old"
degrees and in the new 3+2 degrees at the college level for each academic year.
Appendix Table 2 shows the averages of the data by year. The ￿rst 3+2 degrees
were introduced in year 2001 and the ￿rst 3+2 graduates appeared in 2002.6
Figure 2 shows the total number of graduates in Italy in each year t divided by
the population aged 25-34 (from ISTAT sources). We divide the ￿ ow of graduates
in each year by the stock of the relevant population (the stock varies every year)
to control for cohort size e⁄ects and demographic trends. The picture shows the
total number of graduates and the old type of graduates. From 2002 the share of
3+2 graduates (the di⁄erence between the two lines) grows and the old type of
graduates gradually disappears. The reform coincides with a big increase in the
supply of college graduates relative to the stock of the population aged 25-34, a
doubling of the yearly supply in percentage of the population from year 2000 to
2007.
We build the percentage of 3+2 graduates among the total graduates in each
university for every academic year in the sample (1998￿ 2008) and then we ag-
6In the ￿rst period 2002-2004, the 3+2 graduates are those who followed old type courses
and then switched to the newly introduced degrees before graduation. The "switchers" present
a selection problem that we do not address here because we work with data aggregated at the
level of region while the selection issue is more likely to be relevant at the level of individuals in
a single university (see Bratti et al. 2011 for a treatment of this issue). The ￿rst graduates who
actually followed only 3+2 courses from the start, graduated in the the year 2004.
11gregate this percentage on a regional basis (pooling all univerisities of the same
region), the lowest level of aggregation which can be matched to LFS data. This
variable is indicated as share(3 + 2)jt in equation 1 above and measures the "in-
tensity" in the introduction of the reform in each region j at time t. Aggregated
at the regional level, the administrative data show a strong variation in the intro-
duction of the 3+2 reform. Appendix Table 3 shows that di⁄erent regions have
di⁄erent shares of 3+2 graduates (averaged over all years and in the ￿rst period
of the introduction 2002-2004).
The variable share(3 + 2)jt not only measures the intensity of the reform but
it is also a good measure of the change in the total supply of graduates in region
j at time t. Figure 3 plots share(3 + 2)jt against the total number of graduates
divided by the population aged 25-34: those regions with the highest share of 3+2
graduates are also the regions with the highest total supply of graduates in year
t. Potentially share(3+2)jt is endogenous and rather than being supply driven it
may respond to the higher demand for education in certain regions which may lead
universities to produce new graduates more rapidly. The causality nexus seems
to run from the share of 3+2 graduates to the total number of graduates: if we
regress the share of 3+2 graduates on the total number of graduates divided by
the population aged 25-34 using all years after 2002 the coe¢ cient is 0.025 (0.003)
e R2 Ł 0.35; but if we regress share of 3+2 graduates in 2002 (the ￿rst year the new
graduates appeared) on the total number of graduates divided by the population
aged 25-34 in 2000 - before the introduction of the reform - the coe¢ cient is
insigni￿cant 0.005 (0.017). This is an indication that in the ￿rst year of the reform
the regions with the highest share of 3+2 graduates were not necessarily the same
as those with the highest number of graduates (relative to the population) before
the reform.
3.1 IVs and IV validity
To isolate variation in share(3 + 2)jt due to supply changes, we use the share of
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Figure 2: Ratio of total number of graduates in year t on the population 25-
34. The vertical line indicates the appearance of the ￿rst post-reform graudates.
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of ratio of total graduates in t over the population aged 25-34
against the share of 3+2 graduates. Each point is a region-year average. Source:
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of the share of 3+2 graduates in t over the share of 3+2
degrees opened t-3. Each point is a region-year average. Source: CNVSU data.
15the share of 3+2 graduates three years later.7 Three years is the average duration
of college. Using CNVSU data we construct the share of 3+2 degrees in the total
degrees for each university and the share of enrolled students in the new 3+2
degrees, then we aggregate by region. Figure 4 plots the share of 3+2 graduates
share(3+2)jt against the share of the 3+2 degrees among the total degrees o⁄ered
in region j in year t ￿ 3: each point is a region-year average obtained pooling all
universities in each region. The ￿gure shows that the share of degrees opened three
years before is a good predictor of the share of graduates in year t.
These instruments are valid under the assumption that universities which in-
troduced 3+2 degrees more rapidly did so for other reasons and irrespectively of
the predicted labor market outcomes of their students. We would be worried if the
universities with the best (or worst) perspectives for their graduates were also the
same that introduced the reform quicker (or slower) because this would indicate
that the instrument is not orthogonal to the dependent variable of interest. We
can test this hypothesis matching CNVSU data to the ISTAT survey of graduates
in 2001. We regress the share of 3+2 degrees in university j in between the years
2001 and 2007 (taken from CNVSU) on the average (log) wage and employment
probability of the students graduated by the same university in year 2001 (taken
from ISTAT survey of graduates of 2001).
Table 1 shows the result of the following regression: share(3 + 2)j2001￿2007 =
a + blogwj2001 + ￿emplratej2001 + "j where share(3 + 2)j2001￿2007 is the share of
3+2 degrees in university j between year 2001 and 2007 (columns 3 to 6 use the
share of male and females enrolled in 3+2 degrees in the same years as dependent
variable). logwj2001 and emplratej2001 are respectively the average wage and av-
erage employment rate (measured in 2004) of students graduated in university j
in 2001 i.e. before the reform.
The results in Table 1, unweighted and weighted by the number of students in
each university, show that the speed of introduction of the reform is not related to
the labor market results of the university graduates before the reform and therefore
they support the validity of the instruments. The share of males and females
7We use as IV the share of students enrolled in 3+2 degrees in addition to the share of 3+2
degrees to account for universities which opened many 3+2 degrees with few students each.
16enrolled in 3+2 degrees between years 2001 and 2007 in university j (column 3 to
6) is always unrelated to the average labor market performance of the graduates
of the same university in 2001. The share of 3+2 degrees is signi￿cantly related
to the employment probability of the graduates of university j in the unweighted
regression (column 1), however it is di¢ cult to make sense of these results since
the universities with a higher share of 3+2 degrees between 2001 and 2007 are
negatively related to the average wages of their students and positively related to
their average employment probabilities. For this reason we conclude that these
results not necessarily indicate that the universities with the higher incidence of
3+2 degrees were acting with an eye to their students labor market perspectives
and thus the instruments are valid. The opening of new degrees did not follow
the potential un￿lled demand, rather the increase in number of 3+2 degrees often
followed other criteria such as the availability of professors and/or of public funds
across universities which resulted in an explosion of new 3+2 degrees some of them
with very low student attendance (see Bratti et al. 2008 for a similar analysis of
the expansion in the number of universities in Italy during the ￿ 90s).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Results for males
Table 2 provides the results for males aged 25￿ 34, full-time students excluded.
Each column includes region and year dummies to absorb regional and time-speci￿c
e⁄ects, sectoral dummies and one dummy to control for two age brackets of age
(24-29 and 30-34). The table shows both OLS linear probability models and com-
parable models estimated with instrumental variables (IV). Column 1 indicates
that overall male graduates have a 5% lower employment rate relative to non-
graduates in the age range 25￿ 34. This result is due to the fact that we do not
control for labour market experience: a 25 years old high school graduate is much
more likely to work than a college graduate of the same age.
The share of 3+2 graduates in region j at time t does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the probability of being employed for the non-graduate worker, while it positively
17a⁄ects the same chance for the college graduate worker, with a coe¢ cient of 0.069
(0.015).8 Applying the marginal e⁄ect to a discrete variation, the quanti￿cation of
this result is the following: one unit increase in the share of 3+2 graduates means
going from zero (pre-reform) to one (i.e. complete transition to the post-reform
world￿ almost attained at the time of writing) corresponds to an increase of 7%
in the relative probability of employment of college graduates wrt. high school
graduates. This implies that at reform completion the -5% points of employment
rate of college graduates wrt. high school graduates of the same age 25￿ 34 should
be reversed to +2%.
The reform designed to make easier the use of the apprenticeship contract
improves the employment outcomes for non-graduates with a coe¢ cient of 0.099
(0.015) and reduces the probability of being employed for the graduates. Dif-
ferently, the estimated coe¢ cients for the reform of ￿xed-term contracts imply
a signi￿cant and positive impact both for non-graduates and graduates. These
e⁄ects are plausible because apprenticeship contracts are designed for the use of
high-school graduates while ￿xed-term contracts are popular both among high
school and college graduates.
To explore whether the estimate of the average coe¢ cient is hiding the presence
of regional di⁄erences, in column 2 we interact each variable of interest with the
dummies for the three main macro-regions in Italy, respectively North, Centre and
South (ISTAT de￿nition). We ￿nd that the 3+2 reform signi￿cantly increases the
probability of employment for male graduates, with a coe¢ cient of 0.073 (0.024)
and this e⁄ect is substantially the same across regions. The results on labor mar-
ket reforms indicate more variation across regions. The reform of apprenticeship
contracts signi￿cantly reduces the employment probabilities of graduates in the
Centre, used as the reference group, but the e⁄ect is positive and signi￿cant for
the North and the South. The reform of ￿xed-term contracts has increased the
employment chances of both non-graduates and graduates in the Centre, but the
8Excluding fulltime students in the sample of individuals age 25￿ 34 we risk excluding those
who are actually still studying late (probably those with the worst work prospects), i.e., we may
induce an upward bias in the coe¢ cient of the probability of being employed. We tried the same
regressions including fulltime students (the number is 1980 and 1540, respectively for women
and men) but there are no qualitative changes in the results.
18estimated coe¢ cients indicate that the e⁄ect is signi￿cantly lower for graduates in
the North.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate the same analysis using an IV approach in order to
test the robustness of the previous results and to correct the possible endogeneity
of the share of the 3+2 graduates. The estimated coe¢ cients are substantially the
same. The share of the 3+2 graduates a⁄ects positively the employment proba-
bilities for graduates as in the previous models. The overidenti￿cation test is not
always passed, but the alternative use of a single instrument produces essentially
the same results.
4.2 Results for females
In Table 3 the same models are replicated for females. The results are weaker than
those obtained for males. The estimated coe¢ cient of the university reform for the
average employment probability of college graduates across regions is 0.027 (0.016).
Unlike for males, in column 2 we detect signi￿cant di⁄erences between regions for
females. In the Centre and the North of Italy the reform a⁄ects positively the
employment probability of female graduates (similarly to men) but in the South the
3+2 reform reduces signi￿cantly the employment chances for graduates (-0.148).
In other words, we ￿nd that the supply e⁄ect has a opposite impact in the South,
reducing the relative employment probabilities of female college graduates relative
to non-graduates. It seems that the increase in the number of new female graduates
has not been absorbed in the South.9 Before attempting an interpretation of the
results we present a series of robustness checks.
9This result is robust to the use of IV variables in column 4 (actually the negative e⁄ect
in the South is much stronger with IVs). We are able to show the robustness of the result
by excluding one region in turn from the regression. The coe¢ cient estimate is stable and
signi￿cantly negative, only in one case do the upper bounds of the standard errors hit marginally
zero. On the contrary the results of a dynamic speci￿cation where share(3 + 2)jt has multiple
leads and lags does not give signi￿cant coe¢ cients due to overparametrization.
194.3 Robustness checks
In Table 4 we run several robustness checks. One main issue of concern is that
using the same age brackets 25-34 for both high-school and college graduates is
problematic because we cannot control for the actual (and very di⁄erent) labor
market experience of the two groups. The interaction terms between university
reform and the graduate vs. non-graduate dummy is likely to be a⁄ected by the
di⁄erent labour market experience and time to search for the right job match of
the two groups. Ideally one would like to compare the employment outcomes of
both groups within a period of time after completion of full-time studies. To this
extent we constructed a sample of non graduates in the age bracket 20-24 and a
treatment group of graduates in the age bracket 25-29. The results reported in
column 1 show that the di⁄erences in average employment disappear (coe¢ cient
on graduate) but the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the reform on the two groups remains
signi￿cant for males but not for females (panel 2).10
Another source of concern is that the results may re￿ ect the fact that employ-
ment was already trending in a di⁄erent way by region before the introduction
of the reform. To this extent in column 2 and 3 we introduce region*time trends
and region*time trends plus sector*time trends to account for possible pre-existing
trends that may predate the adoption of the reform and could otherwise be con-
founded with adoption. In this case the identi￿cation is due to the discontinuity
of the reform around the trend. The results appear to be robust to the inclusion of
region*time trends and sector*time trends. These speci￿cations can provide reas-
surance that our coe¢ cients are not re￿ ecting smoothly trending omitted variables
(employment shifts due to regional trends and to national trends in a region in-
dustry) that are potentially correlated with the intensity of the reform. In the case
of females (panel 2) controlling for trends turns out to be important because the
coe¢ cient on reform intensity turns positive and signi￿cant, probably signalling
important sectoral trends in the employment of females.
10The results also hold when we use the sample of 16-24 for non graduates and 25-34 for
graduates or when we impute labor market experience using a proxy. These results are available
upon request.
20A further issue concerns the timing of the reform. The regional expansion of
3+2 university degrees is the source of variability that we exploit to understand
the relationship between the increase in the supply of college graduates and their
relative probability of employment. The new degrees were ￿rst established in 2001
therefore between 2002 and 2004 the variation in the supply of 3+2 college gradu-
ates is made by switchers who changed to the new degrees just before graduation
(see note 6). Since this group is subject to selection issues that we do not address,
for robustness we show in column 4 the results obtained from year 2004 inclu-
sive onwards. The results of column 4 show that in all cases (males, females and
whole sample) the e⁄ect of a higher share of 3+2 graduates in region j is stronger
positive in the years after the introduction of the new system rather than when
we also include the pre-reform period. This may signal the fact that since some
universities allowed students who were falling backward in their studies in the old
system to switch to the new 3+2 system, this phenomenon may have created a
temporary distributional e⁄ect with a shock to supply of new graduates and a
likely lowering of their average quality (and employability). The results on the
period 2002 onwards (not shown) are very similar.
Finally we test the robustness of the results using probit models rather than
linear probability models, the marginal e⁄ects reported in column 5 are lower but
still very signi￿cant for males and insigni￿cant for females. We did not expect very
di⁄erent results because the linear probability model is "almost" fully saturated.
(see note 6). The last panel of the table which shows the results for men and
women togheter re￿ ects the positive e⁄ect on the employment rate of males rather
than the insigni￿cant e⁄ect on females.
4.4 Discussion of results
In principle the positive employment e⁄ect of the reform for male graduates could
simply re￿ ect a pure compositional e⁄ect whereby the new younger and more
employable graduates substitute old type of graduates. Surely new graduates are
younger, may have di⁄erent unobservable characteristics (the selection into college
may be di⁄erent) and may have accumulated a di⁄erent type of knowledge at
21university. However the "composition story" is unlikely to be the full explanation
of the results because the reform does not only substitute old and new graduates
but also constitutes an increase in the total supply of graduates in the market.
Issues of substitution and complementarity of old and new graduates are best
addressed with ￿rm-level data rather than with individual level data, however we
look into the di⁄erence of the impact of the reform on new and old graduates from
2004 onwards (the ￿rst year that the information on new graduates is available in
the LFS). In the "pure composition story" we should see opposite e⁄ects on the
employment probabilities of old and new graduates in the regions where the share
of new graduates share(3+2)jt is higher after 2004. If the e⁄ect spills over to old
graduates, then an e⁄ect due to the overall supply of graduates is more likely.
In Table 5 we run the same regressions as in Tables 2 and 3 distinguishing the
two types of graduates. We report only the coe¢ cients concerning the 3+2 reform.
It appears that the positive e⁄ect of the reform on the employment probability for
males a⁄ects both old and new graduates although the positive e⁄ect on new
graduates is stronger. For females the e⁄ect of a higher supply of new graduates is
insigni￿cant on employment probability of new graduates but it is positive on the
probability of old graduates (although it is also negative for old graduates in the
South, coe¢ cient not shown). These results point to an e⁄ect that is not limited to
the simple substitution of old with new graduates but rather to a supply increase
that has consequences for both old and new graduates alike.
In a framework of supply and demand, if share(3+2)jt is a good indicator of the
increase in the total supply of graduates, then we should expect an increase in the
unemployment rate of graduates unless an o⁄setting increase in demand and/or a
decline in relative wages (or an increase in temporary contracts at lower wages)
has taken place. So far we have shown that, controlling for contemporaneous labor
market reforms which may have increased the relative demand for graduates, male
graduates have increased their relative probability of employment while women in
the South have reduced theirs due to the introduction of the university reform.
The di⁄erence between males and females can be explained if excess supply of
female graduates in the South is not absorbed by a su¢ cient decline of relative
22wages. In view of explaining these results the next section investigates the e⁄ect
of the university reform on the use of temporary contracts and on relative wages.
5 Temporary employment and job quality
In this section we look at the impact of the university reform on the job quality
of both non-graduates and graduates. As a measure of job quality, we use the
probability to be employed under (any type of) a temporary contract, which could
be considered a good proxy for working conditions and wage levels.11
Table 6 shows that the university reform has a signi￿cant positive impact on
the probability of being a temporary worker only for male graduates. We report
only the IV coe¢ cients because they are qualitatively the same as those of the
OLS linear probability model. Male graduates have a 7% higher probability of
being employed with temporary contracts (column 1). The increase of one unit
(from pre-reform to full introduction of the reform) in the share of post-reform
graduates increase by 7% the relative probability of graduates to have a temporary
contract but has no e⁄ect on women. The reform of apprenticeship and of ￿xed-
term contracts has strangely no e⁄ect on the probability of being on a temporary
contract. However it may still be the case that the coe¢ cient hides some regional
di⁄erences across regional labour markets.
In column 2 we control also for the presence of regional di⁄erences. The esti-
mated coe¢ cients for the 3+2 reform indicate that the university reform increases
signi￿cantly the probability of temporary contracts for male graduates in the South
(0.134) In columns 4 the same models are replicated for females. The 3+2 reform
has basically no e⁄ect on the probability of being a temporary workers for females
11After 2004 more detailed information on the type of temporary contract is available in the
LFS, therefore it is possible to calculate the probability of employment by type of temporary
contract. Between 2004￿ 2007 temporary contracts are 16% of total employment. Of temporary
contracts: Apprendistato 6%, CFL 5%, Tempo determinato 71%, Lavoro interinale 3%, Altro
contratto (stage, co.co.co, co.co.pro, lavoro occasionale) 15% with no substantial di⁄erence be-
tween college graduates and non-college graduates in the distribution of the types of temporary
contracts. When we run our basic equation in the period 2004￿ 2007 on the probability of being
on a ￿xed-term contract rather than on the total temporary job we obtain similar results to
Table 6.
23while the reform of apprenticeship increases the probabilities of graduates to have
a temporary contract in the Centre (0.057), but reduces it in the South (-0.096),
see column 4.
There are two concerns with these results. The ￿rst is that the information
on age comes only in brackets and a full control for experience in the labour
market is unfeasible: this could a⁄ect the estimate of the coe¢ cient of interest
"graduate ￿ share3 + 2" because after the reform graduation is attained at a
younger age and a temporary contract is likelier for younger and less-experienced
workers. To this extent in robustness Table 7 we run the regressions on the sample
of non-graduates age 20-24 summed to the sample of graduates aged 25-29. The
results are now not signi￿cant for males and even negative for females.12 In the
following column we add as additional independent variable a proxy for labour
market experience which takes values 5, 9, 9 and 15 to approximate the years of
labour market experience of graduates and non-graduates belonging to the age
range 25-29 and 30-34 respectively. The results con￿rm that the 3+2 reform had a
positive e⁄ect on the probability of employment in a temporary contract although
these e⁄ects are surely stronger among males rather than females.
The second concern is that the de￿nition of temporary contract has changed
in 2004 making the sample of temporary workers potentially discontinuous across
time.13 To investigate these issues further we run the regressions on a sample
restricted to years 2004-2007 for homogenous measurement of the temporary con-
tracts (column 4). Again the results are not signi￿cant.
In conclusion the university reform has increased the relative probability of em-
ployment in temporary contracts for males and had no e⁄ect for females. Although
the results for males are not robust to controls for labor market experience and
12Furthermore - and similarly to the case of employment probabilities - controlling for experi-
ence makes the base di⁄erence (the coe¢ cient graduate) in temporary employment probabilities
between graduates and non graduates disappear at least for males.
13In the old LFS the identi￿cation of a temporary job depends on the respondent￿ s perception
which leads to underestimating the total number of people formally employed under ￿xed-term
contracts (Tattara and Valentini, 2010; Barbieri and Sestito, 2008). In the new labour force
survey (RCFL), the self-perception criteria has been replaced with questions designed to better
reconstruct the real contract type of those individuals who declare themselves to be employed,
and to recover the short-term jobs often hidden in the previous system.
24to diferent time spans, they hold when adding region*year ad sector*year trends
(column 3) and to probit models (column 5).
6 College wage premium
So far we have examined how the positive e⁄ect of the reform on the number of
graduates has led to a deterioration of employment conditions, in terms of a higher
share of graduates employed in temporary contracts relative to non-graduates.
Another potential adjustment mechanism is through relative wages: when the
relative supply of graduates increases, market equilibrium is restored through a
reduction in their relative wages. In this section we provide preliminary evidence
on this hypothesis.14
Since the LFS does not collect information on wages until 2009, we look at the
college wage premium by pooling the data from four ISTAT surveys: the ￿ Survey
on the college-to-work transitions of university graduates of 2001 and of 2004￿and
the ￿ Survey on the school-to-work transitions of high school graduates of 2001 and
of 2004￿ . The four surveys collect information on the post-graduation wages of
high school and of college graduates of a given year, collected three years after
graduation. Pooling data from the survey of high school graduates and of college
graduates, it is possible to estimate the college wage premium of graduates of 2001
(pre-reform) and of 2004 (post-reform).
We pool all four surveys in a single dataset of high school and college graduates
in the year 2001 and 2004 whose wages are collected in the years 2004 and 2007.
The descriptive statistics are in Appendix Table 4 divided by year and in total.
We run the following regression:
14The analysis of the wage e⁄ects of the reform deserves further research aimed at tackling the
issue of selection of students from old courses in the post-reform 3+2 courses and, within the
new system, the selection from the ￿rst three years of college into the two specialisation years.
These issues are the focus of a companion paper (Bratti, Cappellari and Leonardi, 2011). In this
present paper we report only a descriptive analysis aimed at testing the validity of the simple
supply and demand framework as a framework for thought.
25logwit = ￿ + X￿ + ￿1graduatei + ￿2year07 + ￿3(year07 ￿ graduatei) + eit
where t is equal either to 2004 or 2007 (henceforth we use the year of interview
rather than the year of graduation to denote time). The log net monthly wages
(nominal wages, not de￿ ated) three years from graduation is regressed on X which
includes a set of individual characteristics (female dummy, the age is in brackets),
job characteristics (temporary contract, part-time, sector of activity) and subject
and ￿nal mark of graduation; on a dummy graduate which indicates the college
premium in 2004 and on the interaction year07 ￿ graduate which indicates the
college premium of 2007 relative to 2004.
This exercise is purely descriptive, the main identifying assumption is that, con-
ditional on the covariates, graduates in year 2001 and in year 2004 are ￿the same￿ .
In order to increase the credibility of this assumption, we estimated speci￿cations
including college major ￿xed e⁄ects and university ￿xed e⁄ects. When both college
major and university ￿xed e⁄ects are included in the analysis, we will be investigat-
ing the di⁄erences in the college wage premium of graduates of 2001 and of 2004 in
the same college major and from the same university. Controlling for both college
major and university ￿xed e⁄ects is important as educational standards and la-
bor market outcomes are likely to systematically di⁄er both among college majors
(Ballarino and Bratti 2009, Buonanno and Pozzoli 2009) and among universities
(Brunello and Cappellari 2008, Bag￿Łs et al 2009, Di Pietro and Cutillo 2006).
Furthermore the reform - which a⁄ects the college premium of graduates in 2004
measured in 2007 - is likely to have changed the college major mix among gradu-
ates and the distribution of graduates across universities may also have changed,
in case some institutions expanded their o⁄er especially of short degrees. Finally,
as any change in the business cycle which may a⁄ect wages of treated and controls
di⁄erently in the two periods will be captured by the reform dummy, we inserted
in the regression the regional unemployment rate of the age group 25-34.
Table 8 (column 1) for males indicates that college graduates have in 2004 a
premium of 29% but this is reduced by 7% in 2007. There are very little di⁄erences
26across speci￿cations and even when controlling for university ￿xed e⁄ects in 2007
the loss is of 7% i.e., graduate students of the same university in 2007 have a
college premium reduced by 7% in 2007 wrt. 2004. The results for females are
qualitatively similar (Table 9). Female graduates in 2004 enjoy a larger premium
than men at around 42%, in 2007 the premium falls o⁄around 8% even controlling
for graduation in the same universities. The interactions with North and South in
columns 3 indicate that the excess supply of female college graduates in the South
of Table 3 is not re￿ ected on the female college premium in the South in 2007
(coe¢ cient Graduate ￿ year07 ￿ South of Table 9 is insigni￿cant).
The reduction of the wage premium is due to a composition e⁄ect or is it the
e⁄ect of an increase in supply? Again we do not have a bullet-proof reply because
the reform both substitutes new to old graduates and increases the number of
college graduates. However we look for hints. In 2004, the ￿rst cohort of post-
reform students enrolled under the reformed system completed their studies, while,
in parallel, students from the old system were still graduating from universities i.e.
the college wage premium of graduates of year 2004 (measured in 2007) is a mix of
pre-reform and post-reform wage premia. In the last column of Tables 8 and 9 we
compare the college premium of old graduates in 2004 and 2007. New graduates -
males and females alike - earn on average 4% less than old graduates (in 2007, the
only year when we can measure new graduates) but the reduction of the college
premium between 2004 and 2007 is not due only to the presence of new graduates
because it is reduced for old graduates too. The wage premium of an old graduate
in 2004 was 35% for males and is reduced by 5% in 2007; it was of 56% for females
and is reduced by 6% in 2007. This is further indication that the reform is not
only a composition e⁄ect but the supply e⁄ect has reduced wages of old graduates
too.
7 Conclusions
The university reform introduced in Italy in 2002 prompted an increase in the
supply of graduates. We use administrative data on the number of new degrees
27opened by universities to build a measure of the change in supply by region and
year and measure the e⁄ects of the 3+2 reform on the labour market for graduates.
For males the positive e⁄ect of the reform on employment probabilities of grad-
uates is uniform across regions while for females the e⁄ect is weakly positive on
average but negative in the South possibly indicating an excess supply of college
graduates. We advance some possible interpretations of the positive e⁄ect of the
supply expansion on male graduates. These results are obtained controlling for
contemporaneous introduction of labor market reform therefore the di⁄erence is
unlikely to be due to omitted labor demand variables. Surely there is a mechanical
composition e⁄ect when new 3+2 graduates - who are younger and more employ-
able - substitute old type graduates. However the results after 2004 indicate that
the e⁄ect of the 3+2 reform extends to old graduates. We favor an explanation
based on a supply-demand framework: supply shifts due to the 3+2 reform in-
creases the relative employment rate of graduates because the contemporaneous
advent of labour market reforms increased the employment rate of graduates in
(low-wage) temporary contracts thus avoiding an increase in unemploment. Excess
supply creates downward pressure on the graduate premium. This is con￿rmed
by the analysis of the ISTAT data which show a reduction of the college premium
after the reform: the wage premium measured in 2007 is reduced by 7% for males
wrt. to 2004. These results hold even for students graduating from the same
universities in the same majors and are consistent with the evidence on declining
entry wages of new graduates by Rosolia and Torrini (2007) and Naticchioni and
Ricci (2009). Again the composition e⁄ect does not seem to be the full explanation
because lower graduate wages after the reform are certainly due to the negative
penalty that new 3+2 graduates su⁄er wrt. old graduates after the reform, but
also old-type of graduates earn around 5% less than before the reform.
Two results may help explain the contrast between the positive e⁄ect of the
supply expansion on male graduates and a negative e⁄ect on females in the South.
First, only for males do we ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the quality of employment
(measured as the probability of employment in a temp contract). Second, the
negative e⁄ect of the reform on employment probabilites is not re￿ ected in a decline
28of female graduate wages in the South where the excess supply of female college
graduates is more evident. In conclusion for females in the South the increase in
the supply of graduates is not absorbed by a higher employment rate in temporary
contracts nor by a particular decline of wages in the South therefore their relative
employment rate is reduced.
Further analysis and better data are certainly needed to re￿ne the analysis and
overcome the limitations of this paper especially regarding the lack of information
on the actual labor market experience and on the university of graduation of indi-
viduals. To distinguish the composition hypothesis from the theory that assumes
a spill over of the supply of new graduates on the outcomes of all graduates, it is
necessary to look at substitution e⁄ects in the demand of ￿rms and to look deeper
in the wage and employment e⁄ects of the reform taking into account the selection
process into the second tier of the university reform (see Bratti, Cappellari and
Leonardi 2011).
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APPENDIX: LABOR MARKET REFORM DUMMIES
Contemporaneous to the introduction of the 3+2 reform, labour market reforms
may have increased the relative demand for graduates. As in other European coun-
tries, a series of measures introduced various kinds of ￿xed-term and temporary
contracts without changing the legislation on permanent, open-ended, contracts.
Our analysis focusses on the reform of the ￿xed-term contract of 2001 and the
new apprenticeship contract of the Biagi Law in 2003. For semplicity, and be-
cause they are both part of the overall labour market reform written by the same
person, Marco Biagi, we call both of them "Biagi law". Both reforms aimed at
making the use of ￿xed-term and apprenticeship caontracts easier for ￿rms. For
the institutional details of the reforms see Cappellari et al. (2009). We use re-
gional and regional-sector variation in these two reforms to identify the potential
demand shifts to graduates￿employment rate. The ￿xed term contract eform of
2001 was implemented through collective bargaining agreements only from 2005
onwards. We build a dummy (indicated as ref_fixedtit in Equation 1) to indicate
the reform of ￿xed-term contracts, which takes the value one from 2005 on, in the
following sectors: textiles, wood, chemicals, commerce, construction, foodstu⁄s.
The implementation of the apprenticeship contract reform of 2003 required a set
31of regulations to be issued by the regions. In 2006 the government acted to substi-
tute the regions which had been slow with the regulations in some sector through
collective agreements. We build one dummy (indicated as ref_apprit in Equation
1) which indicates the reform of the apprendistato and takes the value one after
2005 in two regions, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, which enacted regional laws
to enable the use of the new contract by all ￿rms. And in another four regions
(in di⁄erent quarters) after 2006: Friuli, Marche, Sardinia and the autonomous
province of Bolzano. The dummy takes the value one in 2006 and after in the
following sectors: foodstu⁄s, chemicals, energy, commerce, banking, construction,
wood, textiles, transport and mechanical engineering. The variable ￿ ref_apprit￿
varies at the region and sector level.
32Table 1: Validity test of IVs: the relationship betw. the gradual introduction of
3+2 and labor market performance of graduates before the reform
share 3+2 degrees share males in 3+2 share females in 3+2
in 2001-2007 in 2001-2007 in 2001-2007
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted unweighted weighted
log average wage 2001 0.104 0.213 0.107 0.241 0.206 0.356
(0.113) (0.209) (0.136) (0.228) (0.152) (0.223)
average empl. rate 2001 -0.231 -0.151 -0.015 0.015 -0.048 -0.010
(0.084)*** (0.155) (0.106) (0.169) (0.098) (0.166)
constant -0.089 -0.909 -0.262 -1.232 -0.952 -2.039
(0.765) (1.410) (0.911) (1.541) (1.032) (1.505)
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005
N 616 616 616 616 616 616
Notes: OLS regressions on data at the level of university on the introduction of the 3+2 reform on average
labour market performance of graduates before the reform. The average wage and average employment rate of
students graduated in 2001 are taken from ISTAT 2001 survey. Weights are the number of students by university
in each year.
33Table 2: The e⁄ect of 3+2 reform on employment probabilities: males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS interactions IV IV interactions
Graduate (dummy) -0.056 -0.066 -0.050 -0.061
(0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)***
Share3+2 -0.083 0.011 -0.032 0.014
(0.054) (0.052) (0.066) (0.067)
Graduate*share3+2 0.069 0.073 0.051 0.058
(0.015)*** (0.024)*** (0.015)*** (0.032)*
Reform appr 0.099 0.077 0.097 0.076
(0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.015)*** (0.021)***
Graduate*ref_appr -0.020 -0.032 -0.014 -0.027
(0.009)** (0.013)** (0.009) (0.016)*
Reform_￿xedterm 0.081 0.061 0.080 0.060
(0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
Graduate*ref_fterm 0.013 0.039 0.016 0.041













Share 3+2 Test F 36.45 44.80
(0.000) (0.000)
Graduate*Share3+2 Test F 281.76 211.25
(0.000) (0.000)
Test of overidentifying 6.669 13.422
(0.154) (0.098)
Observations 215212 215212 215212 215212
R-squared 0.09 0.10
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed or not. All speci￿cations
control for region, age 30-34, sector and year dummies. In column 2 and 4 only the triple interaction terms
interacted with "graduate dummy" are shown. Estimation is by linear probability model and IV. Clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
34Table 3: The e⁄ect of 3+2 reform on employment probabilities: females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS interactions IV IV interactions
Graduate (dummy) -0.006 -0.036 0.001 -0.029
(0.008) (0.011)*** (0.008) (0.012)**
Share 3+2 -0.108 0.008 -0.069 -0.004
(0.077) (0.059) (0.092) (0.079)
Graduate*Share 3+2 0.027 0.067 0.008 0.042
(0.016)* (0.033)** (0.018) (0.039)
Reform_appr 0.101 0.090 0.099 0.083
(0.014)*** (0.019)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)***
Graduate*ref_appr -0.037 -0.034 -0.030 -0.025
(0.009)*** (0.019)* (0.010)*** (0.021)
Reform_￿xedterm 0.093 0.094 0.092 0.092
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)***
Graduate*ref_fterm 0.009 0.026 0.012 0.028













Share 3+2 Test F 23.92 42.53
(0.000) (0.000)
Graduate*Share 3+2 Test F 271.72 223.81
(0.000) (0.000)
Test of over-identifying 2.434 7.650
(0.656) (0.468)
Observations 165977 165977 165977 165977
R-squared 0.12 0.13
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed or not. All speci￿cations
control for region, sector and year dummies. In column 2 and 4 only the triple interaction terms interacted with
"graduate dummy" are shown. Estimation is by linear probability model and IV. Clustered standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
35Table 4: Robusteness check on employment probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit
MALES
2024 vs.2529 trendreg trendreg&sec post2004 probit
Graduate -0.015 -0.056 -0.146 -0.189 -0.041
(0.013) (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)***
Share3+2 -0.177 -0.139 -0.106 0.035 -0.012
(0.107) (0.049)*** (0.043)** (0.046) (0.031)
Graduate*Share3+2 0.096 0.069 0.055 0.135 0.028
(0.031)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)*** (0.009)***
Observations 72923 215212 215212 141197 215212
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.36 0.35
FEMALES
2024 vs. 2529 trendreg trendreg&sec post2004 probit
Graduate 0.039 -0.006 -0.101 -0.142 -0.004
(0.012)*** (0.008) (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)
Share3+2 -0.182 -0.187 -0.116 0.094 -0.010
(0.113) (0.074)** (0.058)** (0.076) (0.048)
Graduate*Share3+2 0.031 0.027 0.049 0.122 0.019
(0.029) (0.016)* (0.013)*** (0.022)*** (0.013)
Observations 60896 165977 165977 109266 165977
R-squared 0.17 0.12 0.52 0.51
ALL SAMPLE
2024 vs 2529 trendreg trendreg&sec post2004 probit
Graduate 0.008 -0.037 -0.127 -0.171 -0.023
(0.011) (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)*** (0.004)***
Share 3+2 -0.183 -0.158 -0.107 0.060 -0.008
(0.107)* (0.057)*** (0.047)** (0.055) (0.036)
Graduate*Share3+2 0.078 0.063 0.059 0.138 0.031
(0.027)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)***
Observations 133819 381189 381189 250463 381189
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.44 0.43
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed or not. In column
(1) we use a sample of non-graduates aged 20-24 and of graduates aged 25-29, full time students excluded. All
speci￿cations control for region, age 30-34, sector and year dummies. In column (2) and (3) we add region*year
dummies and sector*year dummies. In column (4) we use the sample in year 2004 and later. Estimation is by
linear probability model in columns 1-4 and probit (marginal e⁄ects reported) in column 5. Clustered standard
errors for linear probability model are reported in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; ***
signi￿cant at 1%.
36Table 5: The e⁄ect of 3+2 reform on old and new 3+2 graduates after 2004
Males Females
OLS IV OLS IV
Graduate 3+2 -0.197 -0.188 -0.046 -0.031
(0.054)*** (0.055)*** (0.041) (0.042)
Old Graduate -0.125 -0.118 -0.087 -0.087
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
Share 3+2 0.075 0.136 0.159 0.217
(0.046) (0.052)*** (0.049)*** (0.064)***
Old Graduate*Share 3+2 0.181 0.169 0.141 0.140
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
Graduate 3+2*Share 3+2 0.255 0.239 0.081 0.056
(0.074)*** (0.077)*** (0.057) (0.061)
Observations 141197 141197 109266 109266
R-squared 0.08 0.09
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed or not. We use the
sample in year 204 and later. All speci￿cations control for region, age 30-34 and year dummies, a dummy for the
reform of apprenticeship, a dummy for the reform of ￿xed-term contract and the interaction of demand dummies
with the dummies for old graduate and 3+2 graduate. The dummy "Old graduate" indicates a graduate of the pre-
reform system while the dummy "Graduate 3+2" indicates a graduate of the new post-reform system (available
from 2004 in LFS data). Only terms interacted with the regional share of 3+2 graduates are shown. Estimation
is by linear probability model and IV. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%;
** signi￿cant at 5%, *** signi￿cant at 1%.
37Table 6: The e⁄ect of 3+2 reform on temporary employment probabilities: males
and females
Males Females
IV IV interactions IV IV interactions
Graduate (dummy) 0.080 0.085 0.118 0.106
(0.008)*** (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)***
Share 3+2 -0.036 0.005 -0.085 -0.030
(0.038) (0.042) (0.051)* (0.058)
Graduate*Share 3+2 0.074 0.038 0.008 0.016
(0.022)*** (0.055) (0.018) (0.033)
Reform_appr -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016
(0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.020)
Graduate*Reform_appr -0.006 0.003 0.013 0.057
(0.016) (0.036) (0.015) (0.030)*
Reform_￿xedterm -0.002 -0.018 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
Graduate*Reform_fterm 0.002 0.116 -0.026 -0.020
(0.021) (0.058)** (0.021) (0.054)
Graduate*Share 3+2*North -0.003 -0.039
(0.061) (0.042)










Share 3+2 Test F 33.82 39.99 28.84 36.72
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Graduate*Share 3+2 Test F 256.61 203.93 238.19 210.85
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test of over-identifying 9.002 12.417 6.795 6.101
(0.061) (0.133) 0.147 (0.635)
Observations 141663 141663 113138 113138
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed under a temporary
contract or not. All speci￿cations controls for region, sector, age 30-34 and year dummies. In column 2 and 4
only the triple interaction terms interacted with "graduate dummy" are shown. Clustered standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
38Table 7: Robusteness check on temporary employment probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2024 vs.2529 exp.proxy trendreg&sec post2004 Probit
MALES
Graduate 0.006 0.189 0.083 0.129 0.088
(0.015) (0.013)*** (0.008)*** (0.022)*** (0.009)***
Share 3+2 0.004 -0.037 0.033 0.011 -0.005
(0.076) (0.037) (0.039) (0.046) (0.027)
Graduate*Share3+2 -0.065 0.081 0.065 -0.017 0.028
(0.041) (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.043) (0.015)*
Observations 47073 141663 141663 94820 141663
FEMALES
Graduate 0.033 0.260 0.119 0.150 0.126
(0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.021)*** (0.009)***
Share 3+2 0.188 -0.090 0.010 0.027 -0.065
(0.091)** (0.051)* (0.056) (0.066) (0.032)**
Graduate*Share 3+2 -0.064 0.038 0.005 -0.054 -0.017
(0.034)* (0.019)** (0.019) (0.036) (0.016)
Observations 37570 113138 113138 76650 113138
ALL SAMPLE
Graduate 0.028 0.240 0.110 0.152 0.112
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.017)*** (0.007)***
Share 3+2 0.084 -0.053 0.029 0.023 -0.025
(0.075) (0.040) (0.042) (0.050) (0.027)
Graduate*Share3+2 -0.074 0.058 0.030 -0.047 0.004
(0.027)** (0.016)*** (0.016)* (0.030) (0.012)
Observations 84643 254801 254801 171470 254801
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed with a temporary
contracts or not. All speci￿cations control for region, sector and year dummies. Estimation is by IV model
(instruments are share 3+2 degress in t-3 and share of students enrolled in 3+2 degrees in t-3) and probit.
Clustered standard errors for IV model are reported in parentheses. . Column 1 reports the estimates for an IV
model comparing graduates in age range 25-29 with non graduates in age range 20-24. Column 2 reports the
estimates for an IV model on base speci￿cation with the inclusion of a proxy for experience Column 3 reports
the base IV results with the inclusion of region*year and sector*year trends. Column 4 replicates the model in
column 3 for the period 2004-2007 and ￿nally in column 6 we report a probit speci￿cation of our base model. *
signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
39Table 8: College wage premium in 2004 and in 2007: males
OLS OLS OLS interaction OLS old vs. new
Graduate 0.290 0.396 0.408
(0.011)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)***
Year 2007 0.088 0.088 0.066 0.085
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.007)***




















Faculty ￿xed-e⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24987 24936 24936 24936
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29
Notes: Dependent variable is the yearly wage both for high school students and graduates. All speci￿cations
controls for region, year and sector dummies, 5 dummies for ￿nal grades, age in brackets, years out of course, a
dummy for temporary contract, degree subjects, regional unemployment rate in the age group 25-34. Estimation
is by linear probability model. Final column replicates the same linear probability model distinguishing between
old type and new type graduates (present only in 2007). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *
signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
40Table 9: College wage premium in 2004 and in 2007: females
OLS OLS OLS interaction OLS old vs. new
Graduate 0.427 0.418 0.447
(0.012)*** (0.086)*** (0.087)***
Year 2007 0.079 0.078 0.055 0.077
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.008)***




















Faculty ￿xed-e⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26187 26171 26171 26171
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.32
Notes: Dependent variable is the yearly wage both for high school students and graduates. All speci￿cations
controls for region, year and sector dummies, 5 dummies for ￿nal grades, age in brackets, years out of course, a
dummy for temporary contract, degree subjects, regional unemployment rate in the age group 25-34. Estimation
is by linear probability model. Final column replicates the same linear probability model distinguishing between
old type and new type graduates (present only in 2007). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *
signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
APPENDIX TABLES













Hotel and restaurant 0.01 0.05
Transports 0.03 0.04
Finance 0.06 0.02
Real estate 0.21 0.07
Public sector 0.06 0.04
Education and health 0.23 0.07
Other public services 0.04 0.06
No sector 0.24 0.11
Number of (and percentage)
1998 2273 (10%) 20156
1999 2437 (11%) 19551
2000 2513 (11.7%) 18880
2001 2687 (12.9%) 18084
2002 2829 (13.6%) 17884
2003 2764 (13.9%) 17095
2004 9587 (14.1%) 58009
2005 9997 (15.5%) 54310
2006 10073 (16.9%) 49495
2007 10138 (17.9%) 46446
N. obs 55298 319910
Notes: LFS data 1998-2007.
42Table 2: APPENDIX. CNVSU sample composition by year
graduates population aged 25-34 share of 3+2 share of 3+2 share of 3+2 share of 3+2
(2000-2007) graduate degrees male enrolled female enrolled
1998 7613 - 0 0 0 0
1999 8017 - 0 0 0 0
2000 8499 479842 0 0.052 0.026 0.014
2001 9042 475263 0.005 0.514 0.334 0.282
2002 12163 471947 0.122 0.601 0.502 0.454
2003 12354 471947 0.233 0.668 0.630 0.586
2004 14146 451315 0.357 0.725 0.737 0.694
2005 15856 447105 0.492 0.744 0.815 0.774
2006 15809 438157 0.641 0.758 0.861 0.819
2007 15796 430421 0.757 0.771 0.896 0.853
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Table 4: APPENDIX. Descriptive statistics ISTAT 2004 and ISTAT 2007
2004 2007 2004 and 2007
North 0.50 (0.50) 0.55 (0.49) 0.53 (0.49)
Centre 0.26 (0.43) 0.21 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
South 0.24 (0.41) 0.24 (0.41) 0.24 (0.41)
Log wage 6.91 (0.40) 6.99 (0.37) 6.94 (0.38)
Graduates 0.63 (0.48) 0.71 (0.45) 0.66 (0.47)
Final grade in 4 intervals
Final grade 1 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.32 (0.46)
Final grade 2 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43)
Final grade 3 0.20 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
Final grade 4 0.22 (0.41) 0.25 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
Age in brackets
Less than 18 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09)
Age 19 0.26 (0.43) 0.21 (0.39) 0.23 (0.40)
Age 20-24 0.21 (0.41) 0.35 (0.46) 0.30 (0.44)
Age 25-29 0.40 (0.49) 0.29 (0.43) 0.32 (0.45)
Age 30 and over 0.12 (0.31) 0.14 (0.32) 0.14 (0.32)
Temporary contract 0.38 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49) 0.38 (0.48)
Female 0.50 (0.49) 0.52 (0.49) 0.51 (0.49)
Agriculture 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13)
Industry 0.24 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41)
Service 0.74 (0.43) 0.79 (0.41) 0.77 (0.42)
Notes: First column pools the ISTAT survey of high school graduates and the survey of college graduates
interviewed in 2004 three years after diploma and graduation respectively. The second column pools the same
surveys of high school and college graduates of 2004 interviewed in 2007
45